Atheist Social Science Menu

Atheist Social Sciences




Atheism not increasing in America: nov 2015New

The God Disproving Industry*NEW!*
A huge amount of studies done to disprove God they almost
always have crappie methodology

Who is actually self actualized, Atheists or Theists?New

Philosophy and History of Science Disprove Atheism New
Various articles on philosphy and history of scinece and how
they disproves or elucidate atheist ideology.


Is Belief in God Magical Thinking?
a clear exampe of the atheist illusion of technique applied
to "religious thought" and the falsehood of that appraoch.


Are Atheists Their Brother's Keepers?New
Saslow study indicates atheists give more and more motivated
by compassion than religious people. The study has problems.

Are Religious People at Risk for Depression?New
New study form Europe idicates Religous people there are
at higher risk for depression than in U.S. A huge body of
work shows not true.

Atheist Propaganda and Religious Experience
Con Man Darren Brown Fakes Religious Experience
arguing that if he can induce them they are not real.


 Atheist Inflation: Atheists Infalte Numbers
to Look More Popular
 constant refernce to atheism increasing are exaggerated

Zuckerman (Phil) and Paul an Introduction
the idea that increased education increases atheism and causes religious decline

(Phil) Zuckerman File parts 1-3.Includes new paper on history welfare state in Sweden


Nigel Barber's Study: Part 1 cross national test
of uncertainty hypothesis (the Cross Cultural Research Article)
the notion that religion is based upon fear of uncertainty and
declines with increase in income.

Barber part 2: Psychology Today Article
"The Human Beast."
Summarizing his Cross cultural article.


Are Christians More Likely to Go To Prison?
Some atheists argue Christians are 40x more likley but
I have proved their stats are fabricated. Page 2
page 3 A discussion about the question "did Swift fabricate
the Data. (Christians more likely to go to Prison)

Switching faiths in Prison is common according to Pew Sutdy

Study among Chaplains shows that people switch faiths,
Thus the no way to prove that the percentage of Chrsitians in
prison reflects the fate of Christians in society. In other words
many of them became Chrsitians in prison.
Religious Belief and IQ File (Atheist IQ scam)
Includes New Major IQ Study, (by Zuckerman)  
 Part 2 Zuckerman IQ study

Are Natural Scientists Smarter Than Believers? 


Religious belief of Professors Reflects that of General Population.
Taken across the board n all fields, the majority of professors are religious.

Atheist Propaganda On Prayer: Controlled Studies vs. Empirical Miracles
Not studies done by atheists, but atheist spin on prayer studies vs. Lourdes
miracles.

Prayer Study and Atheist Echo Chamber
atheists try to cast suspicion on Lourdes medical committee
their suspicions are disproved.

Center for Inquiry: Atheist Propaganda Machine
Propaganda Machine tries to pass itself off as a valid
research institute does bogus studies inflating the percentage
of atheists in America.

Half Scientists Believe in God.

Is Higher Religious Higher Self Esteem only a Measure of Cultural Norm?
Studies show that religious people have higher self esteem than non religious, but
new study implies this is only in countries where religion is valued.

More Improper Use of Survey Results by Atheists:

New Pew Study: Atheism not Increasing in World Population
every other month a new article comes out saying atheism is increaseing.
Now they make a big thing of the rise of the "nons" but atheism is not 
increasing. 

Are atheists increasing in world population?
Earlier from the one above, the one above is in asnwer to this.
This one warns of the bogus Gallup international.


No Rise In Atheism in America
Atheist claim atheism goes up to 19% but follow the data the truth is
they speaking of 19% of 5% of U.S. Media Hype in USA Today exaggerates
increase in unaffiliated and references old survey that puts atheism at 1.6% real 


American Belief in God in Decline? Half Don't believe with Certainty.
1/6/14. a new Harris poll is bothering people with this new scare that
atheism is increasing.

Social Science that supports validity
of Religious Belief.

 300 studies support Value of Religion


 

Is Sweden a "Society Without God?" part 1: The History of The Social Welfare State in Sweden

 Phil Zuckerman

Phil Zuckerman's major work is Society Without God, What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell us About Contentment.  Put bluntly the idea is basically that what atheists have called "atheist nations" do better, have better social policies are more flourishing than "religious nations." As Zuckerman puts it himself:

They may be few and far between, but there are indeed some significant corners of the world today, however a typical, where worship of God and Church attendance...they aren't very religious at all...Denmark and Sweden, which are probably the least religious countries in the world, and possibly in the history of the world...if there is an earthly heaven for secular folk, contemporary Denmark and Sweden may very well be it...lowest crime rates, lowest levels of corruption in the world, excellent educational systems, innovative architecture, strong economies, well supported arts, successful entrepreneurship, clean hospitals, delicious beer, free health care...[1]

Delicious beer? Let him come to Texas I'll show him delicious beer! Before we get into such matters of high culture let's access Zuckerman's argument. On message boards he is usually represented as saying things like "the atheist nations always do better than non atheist nations becuase they are smarter since they don't have God." He never puts it anywhere near this way. He's really not stupid and he's not so blind that he can't understand what's wrong argument from sign. The way he puts his argument it's actually quite reasonable: "I argue that society without God is not only possible but can be quite civil and pleasant."[2] There's nothing very radical about that. I would actually agree with him, all one need do is see an Ingmar Bergman movie to know that Sweden is the height of human civilization (except for the beer, probalby the only way Texas can compete with them). The problem is the attribution of causes. Does he actually say that Sweden is so great becuase they don't believe in God? Now he admits that his argument is aimed at countering the propaganda of right wing religious types who promote fear that the nation will fall apart if we don't vote republican.[3] On that score I can applaud his efforts as well. To paraphrase, he doesn't actually state it in such a causal way. He doesn't say Sweden is so good because they don't have God, but rather that they can be so good in spite of not having God. I will, however, take issue even with that. A closer look at Sweden will reveal that they are not so totally without God.

My position is that first, atheists who do make the strident claims that "atheist nations" (phrase Zuckerman himself doesn't use) are totally wrong. Countries that do better on sociological measures of national excellence are not so because they are atheistic.Secondly, as to the actual argument he does make, while I basically agree with him to a point, it's important to recognize that point: they didn't get there without Christian contributions, some of them in a big way. Nor are they are without God today as one would imagine. Not that society will far apart if people are aren't weeping and wailing but the recognition of God in a positive relationship with the divine always does one better than not. Such may be true collectively, as a nation.

Let's start with a discussion about the history of the Swedish welfare state. First, a look at the historiography of modern welfare state shows a familiar trend in the recording of Sweden's welfare history. In the ground breaking work, Religions, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States  Kersbergen and Manow state that "most comparativists who study welfare state state development agree that religion has played a role in the development of modern social protection systems."[4] Yet, they go on to find that the advocates of the welfare state only emphasized the socialist movements as the builders of welfare in Europe. They point to John D. Stephens (79) and Wilensy (81) both of whom suggest it seems logical that the Catholics would support a welfare policy but they don't go into any real depth about their contributions. They do find that Catholics did enter into social coalitions as a means of making good on their doctrine and also of garnering working class votes. [5] Over in chapter eight, however, Karen M. Anderson finds that religion is conspicuously absent in most accounts of welfare development in Scandinavia.[6] Most such accounts emphasize the power resources of class movements, in other words, the socialists get all the attention, (Carpi, 78, Stevens 79,Sweson 2002).[7]
Religious party structures were weak and thus they didn't make good coalition members. Anderson goes back to the 1500s and finds that Protestant monarchs creates welfare states that incorporated the chruch into the state apparatus. The state subsumed the religious welfare function such as hospitals and care for the poor. The chruch (in Sweden) supported the 1847 poor law and 1962 local government act thus making it instrumental in building the modern welfare state. The acts established the duty of secular local authorities to support the poor.[8]

Oddly enough, however, the chruch then pulled back form social coalition and turned conservative for the second half of the nineteenth century, opposing socialism and welfare state. The development is complex, it takes the form of the chruch weaving in and out of social policy and coalition building. In the late nineteenth century the turn to conservatism cost them greatly as it put them on the side lines and made them disgruntled spectators in the entire social project of the nation. Yet the role of religion in building the welfare state was not insignificant.[9] Marxists theorizing led historians to put the emphasis upon socialist activities and ignore movement that were not according to class lines. This merely ignores a lot of contributions by the Catholic Church.[10]

Protestantism and The Larger European Context

Although early work on the history of the welfare state had included illuminating analysis of the pro welfare role (eg via democratization) of Protestantism latter work had primarily focused on the positive impact of social Catholicism as politically represented by political democracy on the European continent. "We started to consider the possibility that it had been an unfortunate omission not to consider the impact of social Protestantism on the development of the European and the American Welfare state more generally." Kersbergen and his colleagues use the German example where the German welfare state was a Protestant project. This project was then "usurped" by social Democrats and Catholic Socialists. The bourgeois Protestant middle class was thus aliened from the project. [11]
Another reason why the Protestant contribution was ignored in historiography of welfare state is becuase in most of Europe Protestants tended not to be in favor or large scale welfare expansion. Yet this did not mean that Protestantism was not important. This was especially true in Switzerland, Neatherlands, and UK. Protestantism was always more pronounced among middle class shopkeepers and the authors found that emphasis upon thrift and personal responsibly always marked the Protestant contribution to social welfare state. This tended to have a retarding effect upon the expansion of the welfare state.[12] 

One of their major findings was that the combination of Christian Democracy and Catholic Social Doctrine that expalined the generosity of Christian Democratic welfare states, which was equal in spending to the Scandinavian ones, yet were not designed to counter market forces as were the Scandinavians. This shows itself in decommodifying labor. In other words, the Continental Christian Democratic parties were less Marxist then were their Scandinavian counterparts. They tended not to militate to change class structures but sought to preserve the old economic order, in spite of "helping the poor." [13]

Another source

Christian Aspalter, finds that "the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic movements were responsible for the development of welfare states in general, and in Germany, Austria and Sweden in particular. In Germany Christian Democratic parties managed to dominate post war politics with the help of a smaller liberal party." [14] In Sweden the absence of a Strong Christian Democrat party after the war meant that the Social Democrats established their own model of the welfare state along the lines of systems of the late nineteenth century designed by Swedish Labor paty and Farmer's party. [15]


Conclusion

The role of Christians in the making of the Swedish welfare state, and in that of Europe as a whole, as been overlooked  by historians due to the crowding out of Marxist and other Socialist influences which emphasize labor. In Sweden the problem was worse for Christians since they took a hard turn to the right in the late nineteenth century and thus took themselves out of the social project for time. Sweden was largely Lutheran. Lutheran theology following in the footsteps of its name sake has always had a proclivity toward conservatism. Luther himself urged the nobles to slaughter the peasant revolt in south Germany, even though they were acting under his own influence, because they were engaging in disorder. So it's not so surprising that at the last minute the Lutherns turned away form class identified social reform. If that seems to back Zuckerman's follower's point, there are also the Catholics who followed the class conflict line. Yet their they were important contributors to the basic values that underpin the system form the beginning. In Germany, Austria, and The Netherlands they have played a more direct and more recent role and have been major contributors.

Atheists who try to argue that there is a causal relation between atheism and social responsibility or social welfare don't understand Zuckerman, nor do they understand the history of the welfare state in Sweden. Zuckerman is not arguing that atheism "caused" the social welfare state in Sweden but merely that it's possible for a society with a void of Christian belief to be a workable compassionate society. Yet even he doesn't understand that much of that compassion in Sweden is a hold over from its Christian past. We shall also see in further pages that Sweden is not "un-Christian" and Christianity is not just in its past.






Sources


[1] Phil Zuckerman, Society Without God, What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell us About Contentment New York: New York University Press, 2.
Zuckerman is Ph.D. form Oregon and teaches sociology at Pitzer (a Claremont college).

[2] ibid, 4

[3] ibid

[4] Kees Van Kersbergen and Philip Manow, "Religion and the Western Welfare State--The Theoretical Context," Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, Kees Van Kersbergen and Philip Manow, (ed) 2009. 1-38,1.
Google books: http://books.google.com/books?id=bPYdeROiAD8C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=true

[5] ibid., 2.

[6] Karen M. Anderson, "The Church as Nation? The Role of Religion in the Development of the Swedish Welfare State," in Kersbergen and Manow, op cit. 210-235, 210.

[7] idid.

[8] ibid.

[9]

[10] Kersbergen..., op cit., 2

[11] ibid, vii.

[12] ibid, viii.
They were aided by the work of the Max-Planck Institute for the study of society in understanding the Protestant role in welfare state development.

[13] Ibid. 2.

[14] Christian Aspalter, The Importance of Christian And Social Democratic Movements in Welfare Politics: With Special Reference to Germany, Austria and Sweden. Huntington, New York: Nova Science Publishers inc.,2001, 115.

[15] ibid.

Zuckerman and Paul: Introduction

Overview:Zuckerman and Paul's Alleged "Studies."


Zuckerman


I've seen over half a dozen attempts to do sociological studies that supposedly prove that religion is bad for society. The two major one's are Zuckerman and Paul. These two studies are linked as Zuckerman acknowledges Paul's "study" as foundational for his own.

Zukerman is a Skeptical Enquirer article that someone has tired to use against me and my religious experience studies, but it didn't apply. This trend is making me very angry because it has spawned many of the lies and half truths that are fueling the new Atheism. I see these links to these articles popping up all the time. They make me especially angry because

(1) I was a sociology major, that was my BA. So I do know something about social science research methods.

(2) I was publisher of an academic journal geared to social criticism and a political activist in the CISPES for many years. (committee in Solidarity with People of El Salvador) and a Marxist. So social criticism has been a major part of my life. Seeing that used to lie about Christ and give false information and stupid half truths that hood wink people into disbelief makes my blood boil.

These so called "studies" all make the same basic mistakes. They all feed off each other and footnote each other so they are just making the same one's over and over and creating a self referential kabal of atheist assumptions.


(1) they trade on ignorance and cultural illiteracy

(2) argument from sign

(3) shallow analysis designed to mine the data and bury any deep analysis that would divert blame from religious blame and create a false association.

(4) the false association is that high religious belief is correlated with poverty, illiteracy, low education level, violence.

(5) counter studies vastly outweigh

*2000 studies this is all totally at odds with the findings of real social sciences. Dr. Larsen did a literature search of social science abstracts in the 90's and found that there were 2000 articles, these are in social science journals, real academics who find religion as a positive force in people's lives and in society.

* Cities on a Hill foundation found 300 studies that show religion good for society, contradicting the very things these atheist studies are talking about.

* wurthnow's study of Religious experince found that RE people are better educated, more socially conscious, more sensative to the needs of others, less violent, less depressed, more outgoing, more able to help others.

(6) these are not real studies, Zuckerman and Paul that is.. They are nothing more than people totally up the countries they think are less religious, based upon mainly sterio types but also church attendance, then showing that their education level is higher or their poverty level or violence level lower than deeply religious American south.

What is so monstrously stupid about this is they don't screen out factors like the long history of poverty in a region, or the higher level of education Europe as a hold over form the Christian era in Europe vs the frontier time in America.

they don't consider factors such as America's frontier heritage, only one hundred years or so hence (Arizona, New Mexico, West Texas). Europe was a frontier a thousand years ago. Even then it was mostly civilized, it was really a Frontier in places like France and Germany closer to 2000 years ago. For most of that time education was the work of Christians and Europe was well educated relatively speaking.

Europe was well Christianized and devout less than one hundred years ago, and in that time it was well understood that education was a must. It is so deceptive for these people to try and give credit for the social welfare state and all it has accomplished to atheism when it was basically Christian thinkers who built the welfare state. The first peasant revolts in Italy and Germany were Christian inspired.

All major gains of education in America an Europe were the result of labor battle and unionists who fought for public education, and the Catholic church (mostly in Europe). these unionists were led to a large degree by Christians and Christian women such as Pheobie Palmer and the abolition/sufferage movement who also influenced the drive for public education.


Focus on Zuckerman's data:


Adherents.com

Demonstrates that Zuckerman's data cannot be used to make the sort of inferences atheists make in claiming huge percentages (20%) for atheist world population, or even the counties Zuckerman claims. Just to take lists of memberships and affiliations for countries doesn't distinguish enough between differences such as actual belief in God vs organizational membership.

Pitzer College sociologist Phil Zuckerman compiled country-by-country survey, polling and census numbers relating to atheism, agnosticism, disbelief in God and people who state they are non-religious or have no religious preference. These data were published in the chapter titled "Atheism: Contemporary Rates and Patterns" in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. by Michael Martin, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK (2005). Different type of data collection methodologies using different types of questions showed a consistent pattern: In most countries only a tiny number of people (zero to a fraction of 1 percent) will answer "atheism" or "atheist" when asked an open-ended question about what their religious preference. A slightly larger number of people will answer "yes" if asked pointedly if they are an atheist. A slightly larger number than that will answer "no" when asked if they believe in any type of God, deities, or Higher Power. A slightly larger number answer "no" when asked simply if they "believe in God" (omitting wording indicating more nebulous, less anthropomorphic conceptions of divinity). Finally, a larger number of people answer "none" or "non-religious" when asked asked an open-ended question about what their religious preference is. Although figures vary for each country, average numbers indicate that roughly half of the people who self-identify as "nonreligious" also answer "yes" when asked if they believe in God or a Higher Power.

One portion of this broad grouping includes those who are best described as "nonreligious," i.e., those who are essentially passive with regards to organized religion, generally affirming neither belief nor disbelief. They may be neither contemplative about philosophy and spirituality nor involved in a religious/faith/philosophical community. Although a certain percentage of people in many countries classify themselves as nonreligious in surveys, there are few data indicating how many of these fit the passive "nonreligious" criteria described above, versus those who actually do contemplate such matters, but simply have their own personal philosophy and no stated affiliation with an organized religion.

For the purposes of this list, this grouping also includes more proactive or well-defined philosophies such as secular humanism, atheism, agnosticism, deism, pantheism, freethought, etc., most of which can be classified as religions in the sociological sense, albeit secular religions. A minority among atheists are quite fervent in their beliefs and actively endeavor to proselytize atheism.

The "Secular/Nonreligious/etc." category is probably the most speculative estimate in this list, as this segment of society is difficult to count. The vast majority in this grouping are not aligned with any kind of membership organization. Most figures come from census and survey data, which most countries conduct only infrequently.

The highest figure we have for "Nonreligious" is 20% of the world population, or about 1.2 billion: "Over 20 percent of the world's population does not claim any allegiance to a religion. Most are agnostics. Others are atheists, who deny the existence of God." (O'Brien, Joanne & Martin Palmer. The State of Religion Atlas. Simon & Schuster: New York (1993). Pg 41.) But such a high figure is difficult to support with current country-by-country statistics, and perhaps reflects Communist-era official government statistics. Most current estimates of the world number of secular/nonreligious/agnostic/atheist/etc. are between 800 and 1 billion.

Estimates for atheism alone (as a primary religious preference) range from 200 to 240 million. But these come primarily from China and former Soviet Union nations (especially Russia). Prior to Communist takeovers of these regions and government attempts to eradicate religion, both places had very high levels of affiliation with organized religions (especially Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Taoism), as well as high levels of participation in and belief in traditional local traditions such as shamanism, ancestor ceremonies, spiritism, etc. Since the fall of Communism in former Soviet nations and the relaxation of anti-religious policies in China, observed religious affiliation and activity has increased dramatically, especially in Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam.

China probably does have the largest number of actual atheists of any country in the world and many Russians clearly remain atheists. But at this point, it is difficult to accurately determine how many of those classified as atheists or nonreligious during Communist-era USSR and by the current Chinese government are actually atheists according to their personal beliefs, and how many are unregistered religious adherents or participants in less-organized traditional systems that are oriented around ancestors, animism, shamanism, etc. Many people are unaware, for instance, that China has one of the largest, most active Christian communities in the world, and that in many former Soviet nations religions such as shamanism, Islam and Russian Orthodoxy remained even while official government reports announced the elimination of religion in these regions.

In the Western world, Europe is by far the place with the most self-avowed nonreligious, atheists and agnostics, with the nonreligious proportion of the population particularly high in Scandinavia. The Encyclopedia Britannica reports approximately 41 million atheists in Europe. The self-described nonreligious segment of society in Australia and New Zealand is also high, at around 15%. In Australia less than a tenth of one percent described themselves as atheists in the latest national census (1996). In the U.S. about 13.2% of the population describe themselves as nonreligious, 0.5% describe themselves as agnostic, and a smaller number describe themselves as atheist (Kosmin, ARIS/American Religious Identification Survey, City University of New York, 2001).

Zuckerman (2005) compiled numbers of people who don't believe in God, based primarily on polling and survey data, for every country in the world. He totaled the survey-based and poll-based estimates of non-believers from the top 50 countries with the highest proportion of people who do not believe in God, and added to this number the non-believers from highly populous countries (Mexico, Poland, Moldova Romania, Georgia, Uzbekistan, India, Ireland, and Chile). The remaining countries had proportionately miniscule populations of atheists/agnostics/non-believers. Zuckerman concluded, "the grand total worldwide number of atheists, agnostics, and non-believers in God is somewhere between 504,962,830 and 749,247,571. These minimum/maximum numbers are conservative estimates; were one to factor in a mere .25% of such highly populated countries as Egypt, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Burma, Tanzania, and Iran, as non-believers in God, estimates would be significantly larger. Also, these numbers are only for non-believers of God, specifically. Were one to include all 'non-religious' people in general, the numbers would nearly double... nonbelievers in God as a group come in fourth place after Christianity (2 billion), Islam (1.2 billion), and Hinduism (900 million) in terms of global ranking of commonly-held belief systems."

Zuckerman states that adding the "non-religious" segment of the world population would to his calculated maximum of 749,247,571 (about 750 million) atheists, agnostic and non-believers in God would yield a number nearly twice as large -- just under 1.5 billion. This number is not, however, the number of people who should be classified in the "Secular/Nonreligious/Agnostic/Atheist" category, because half of this larger number is based solely on belief in a single theological proposition (belief/non-belief in God), rather than on a person's religious affiliation/religious preference. A large proportion of people in the surveys Zuckerman combined to arrive at this total expressly are adherents of named religions (such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Chinese traditional religion, Unitarianism and Christianity). Many of these people who do not believe in God, deities, or a Higher Power are nevertheless devout adherents of their various faiths, or even clergy. They are enumerated in the list above as adherents of those faiths, and not counted among nonreligious, atheists or agnostics because their primary religious identity is not atheism or agnosticism. It should be remembered that not all strains of all religions entail belief in God, a Higher Power or deities.



It can not be said based on Zuckerman's analysis that "1.5 billion people do not believe in God."
A large proportion of the people classified as "non-religious" expressly do believe in God or a Higher Power. The 750 million figure is already an attempt to estimate the total population of people who do not believe in God.

Adherents.com puts world atheist population at
2%



Page 2

Zuckerman Part 1

Zuckerman


Simplistic Analysis

Swedish Social History




It's pretty obvious that Zuckerman argues that the society absent of religion is a better society (more progressive, better educated, more socially conscious concerning its needy) than are societies in which people are religious. We can knit pick over weather he used the phrase "atheist nation" or not, but the fact of the matter is the subtitle of his books is "what the least religious states tell us about contentment." (see his new book Society Without God: What the least religous states can tell us about contentment. That makes it pretty what he is arguing. But my argument, my major argument is basically that this is clearly wrong since none of the states he talks about God the way they are by being without God. Most of them had and still have strong religious populations, the European states emerge out of a context of Christianized society. Many people feel that Sweden is the least religious state. This is actually false, the part of the German republic that was the East German side has the most hard core atheists. That is according to the study on Religious Demand that I link to in part 2. Nevertheless,Sweden is a good test case. Let us examine the situation with Sweden.


We find that the Swedes were Vikings prior to the middle ages. They were pagan, they swooped down upon the brits and killed and took what they had. They were bloodthirsty barbarians. Well actually, that's the myth of the Viking. the truth of it is I've seen historians who now say there weren't that many raids, most Swedes were farmers, not vikings. The Viks didn't do that much, other than play football. Be that as it may, they were Christianized in the middle ages and by the reformation they settled into a state church centered around the Lutheran faith. What rading and so forth that did go on as abandoned when the Christianization came along. But out of the Lutheran inspired culture they raised up a modern society and through Christianity taught the core values that became the modern Swedish welfare state. It is true that the formal Church did not have much to do with building the welfare state, which mostly came about after world war II. But the core values planed in the culture by Christianity culminated in the cultural background that made the state possible.

A Political and Social History of Modern Eruope by Carlton J.H.Hayes

Prof of history Columbia University

Vol II, MacMillion 1916

Three Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Denmark, Norway were officially tied to the Lutheran Church. "Popular education was fostered under ecclesiastical supervision; all three people's developed native literature and a lively sense of nationalism. In all three social and Political democracy made steady progress. McMillian 1916




Religion has always played a role in Swedish culture. What Zuckerman pretends is not there, and what he hides in the data, the role played by religion in planting the core values that build the welfare state. He hides this by refusing to draw the distinction between Church attendance and real actual belief. Though attendence is low the role of religion in Swedish society is old, historical, complex and important:

Welfare and Values in Europe:Transitions Related to Religion, Minorities and Gender;

Sweden:
Overview of the national situation
by

Ninna Edgardh Beckman

Page 1

Welfare and Values in Europe:
Transitions related to Religion, Minorities and Gender
(WaVE)
Sweden:
Overview of the national situation
by Ninna Edgardh Beckman
Page 2

PDF
Introduction

Based on its very low figures of religious attendance and traditional religious faith, Sweden has a reputation of being one of the most secularised countries in the world. True as this might be, what the image conceals is the strong and complicated role that religion still plays in Sweden, not least through history and culture. The modern history of Sweden has its foundation in national homogeneity, grounded in the principle of one people and one faith. This principle is closely connected to the Lutheran majority church, to which nearly 80% of the Swedish population still belongs, even though formally state and church were separated in 2000. The recent presence of other world religions and official policies tending towards multiculturalism adds new religious aspects to Swedish culture. Religion thus continues to play an interesting role in Sweden, behind the seemingly straightforward image of a country on its way towards complete secularisation

The Swedish welfare state was built after the Second World War, based on the idea of ‘the home of the people’ (folkhemsidén). The basic principle of the model is that the state and local authorities guarantee the basic needs of all citizens. This principle is based on strong values of solidarity and shared responsibility. Decades of success for the system have since the 1990s been replaced by growing problems with keeping up the high level of benefits and services, a development, which is increasingly questioning also the values underpinning the whole welfare structure. Immigration is one factor, among many, challenging the system and immigrants have also been among those most affected by emerging new forms of poverty

Nothing about atheism or being an atheist involved there


Historians Find Religion Always Played a Role In European Social Democracy


Through Europe the role of religion in the rise of modern secular liberal states is coming to be re-evaluated. Many historians are finding now that religion always played a more vital role than previously thought. Here is a quote from a new ground breaking book:

Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States


Series: Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion and Politics
Edited by Kees van Kersbergen
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
Philip Manow
Review
Universität Konstanz, Germany


This book radically revises established knowledge in comparative welfare state studies and introduces a new perspective on how religion shaped modern social protection systems. The interplay of societal cleavage structures and electoral rules produced the different political class coalitions sustaining the three welfare regimes of the Western world. In countries with proportional electoral systems the absence or presence of state–church conflicts decided whether class remained the dominant source of coalition building or whether a political logic not exclusively based on socio-economic interests (e.g. religion) was introduced into politics, particularly social policy. The political class-coalitions in countries with majoritarian systems, on the other hand, allowed only for the residual-liberal welfare state to emerge, as in the US or the UK. This book also reconsiders the role of Protestantism. Reformed Protestantism substantially delayed and restricted modern social policy. The Lutheran state churches positively contributed to the introduction of social protection programs.

• Radical revision of established knowledge in comparative welfare state studies based on a combination of country case studies and comparative accounts • Introduces a new perspective on why and how religion shaped modern social protection systems and gives a new comparative account of the formation of different welfare state regimes • Systematic inquiry into the role of the state–church conflict for social policy in advanced industrial societies

Contents

1. Religion and the Western welfare state: the theoretical context Philip Manow and Kees van Kersbergen;

2. Western European party systems and the religious cleavage Thomas Ertman;

3. The religious foundations of work-family policies in Western Europe Kimberly J. Morgan;

4. Italy: a Christian democratic or clientist welfare state? Julia Lynch;

5. Religion and the welfare state in the Netherlands Kees van Kersbergen;

6. A conservative welfare state regime without Christian Democracy? The French Etat-providence, 1880–1960 Philip Manow and Bruno Palier;

7. Religion and the consolidation of the Swiss welfare state, 1848–1945 Herbert Obinger;

8. The church as nation? The role of religion in the development of the Swedish welfare state Karen M. Anderson;

9. The religious factor in US welfare state politics Jill Quadagno and Deanna Rohlinger;

10. Religious social doctrines and poor relief: a different causal pathway Sigrun Kahl. Contributors


(contributors include:Philip Manow, Kees van Kersbergen, Thomas Ertman, Kimberly J. Morgan, Julia Lynch, Bruno Palier, Herbert Obinger, Karen M. Anderson, Jill Quadagno, Deanna Rohlinger, Sigrun Kahl).




Modern Swedish life no longer includes church attendance as a strong element. This is the only measurement Zuckerman uses to determine the extent to which Sweden, or any country, is "secularized." But there are other measure that are more important. There is a new role emerging for religion in Northern Europe. The fact of secularization in terms of church attendance does not mean that people are not seeking spiritual reality.

The traditional relationship between swedes and the church has changed. Swedes are no longer as connected to conventional church fucntions. But this does not mean that they don't beileve. There is a new string for alternatives to convention, but the embers of belief are still smoldering.


Article:
Sweden.SE the official gateway to Sweden.

Sep 1, 2006
Are Swedes losing their religion?
by: Charlotte Celsing, freelance writer


Annika Gustafsson is a theology student whose studies have included work experience in congregations and at confirmation camps. She says that almost all of the young people she meets are open to questions relating to religious and spiritual matters, even though they may have objections to ecclesiastical matters.

The role of religion has changed

Religion has not become less important in Swedish society but it has changed color, according to a report from Åbo Academy (Finland). In the secularized Nordic area the Protestant Lutheran church has to be liberal and open to a modern interpretation of the Christian message. Otherwise the church feels too authoritarian – an attitude that most Swedes do not accept....Yet many Swedes express a longing for a spiritual dimension and a deeper meaning. Modern society has left a void that neither science nor a high material standard can fill....Those who the Church of Sweden fails to attract look for alternatives. Non-conformist churches – of which the Pentecostal Movement is the largest with around 87,000 members – is one example. Others are varieties of eastern religions, such as Buddhism or Hinduism.


Due to immigration to Sweden, Islam is now the country’s second largest religion after Christianity. A number of mosques have already been built in different parts of Sweden and more are planned.


Within Christianity the Catholic Church in Sweden is also large. Today it has a total of 80,500 registered members.

* Almost 8 out of 10 Swedes are members of the Church of Sweden - 7 million.
* Only 1 in 10 Swedes thinks religion is important in daily life.
* Around 7 out of 10 children are christened in the Church of Sweden.
* Just over 5 out of 10 weddings take place in church.
* Almost 9 out of 10 Swedes have Christian burials.
* Islam has around 130,000 adherents in Sweden (more according to Muslim
sources).(Ibid)




Zukerman's simplistic formulation would have us believe that Christianity = conservative and atheist = social consciousness and only atheists could ever support progress social institutions.


Modern Church in Europe plays role in social services and culture


2. The second thing is that the church is seen as an emergency exit. The welfare state of Western Europe is the best attempt so far in world history to guarantee safety and security. But life is complicated. In national catastrophes, the churches get filled with people. Catastrophes happen also on a personal basis, and the church has an open backdoor: You are not left alone; you have a backup.

3. The third point is the fact that the churches are seen as embassies of solidarity and mercy. All over Europe, illegal immigrants are hidden by parishes. Anti-racism demonstrations are normally organized by parishes. The protests against reductions in childcare or hospitals and for Jubilee 2000 are signs of solidarity.

From the beginning of Christianity in Northern Europe, the church can be described as a part of the state. Church and state were the same. Probably in the year 1008, King Olof Sk^tkonung of Sweden was baptized by St. Sigfrid, Bishop of Vïxj^. Out of Christianity grew the state. Through baptism you became a Swede. The faith of the king united the nation, confirmed the royal house, and incorporated this northern part of the world into the international community under the pope of Rome.

Five hundred years later the Reformation supported the idea of a nation state. The king of Sweden - as well as the king of Denmark and the king of England - took the place of the pope. They became heads of their national churches. The Swedish king had no liturgical or confessional interests, so the clergy could marry officially but still use the medieval chasubles and hymns and keep the apostolic succession. The king needed the land owned by the monasteries, and in the church he got an obedient instrument for creating conformity in his country: one people, one faith, one king, one church. (Ibid)




In his ground breaking work The Secular City Theologian Harvey Cox Argued that secularization was a good thing. Secularization had created a neutral playing field necessary to stop the religious wars of the seventeenth century. For that very reason secularization has actually been very good religion. It was ironically secularization that allowed the proliferation of religions in America. That's because when there was no state imposed Church Tax, as in much of Europe, and not one organization or Church favored by the state, as in much of Europe and in England, everyone was free to worship as he saw fit and to start new churches, and so they did stat new ones in profusion. Secularization in itself is no threat to religion. But Zuckerman is obviously saying that Society is better off without religion. Now does that mean without church or without any kind of belief? I'm sure he would say the latter, but the only data he presents only backs the former. Yet the conclusions he draws are screwed precisely becasue without taking into account belief in all aspects he's just creating a false data base by equating low church attendance with a less religious society.

Zuckerman reduces the complexity of the development of history int he modern world from the early modern to contemporary, with its sweeping changes in economics, sociology, psychology, technology, the means of production, political theory and so forth, burying all under the rug and reducing it all to a simplistic formula about church attendance. From this kind fo superficial bs atheist mold and shape their morose of lies and propaganda to destroy civilization.


Here's a quotation I found on a blog comment section by a Dane about Zuckerman's book:

This a person claiming to be an Anthropologist on a blog called "the squre."

From the Square (blog)

Comment from karen Schousboe
Time November 25, 2008 at 4:24 am


To readers who were duped by zuckerman’s book it might accordingly be of interest to know, that Denmark is in no way a society without God. 82% of the Danish population are members of the Danish national Church and have a fond relationship with their local church. It is true that the church is considered a different entity and plays a different role in the local community than what is common in US. This has to do with the fact that the churches are not so much old institutions, than old buildings framing the idea of Danishness - Danes don’t talk about God directly; they talk about their family, their history, their traditions. The preferred location chosen for this “conversation” is however their local church, which means that people do not seek the church sunday mornings to celebrate God; but they take part in year-long and life-long celebrations whenever there is a special occasion in the life of our families or communities. Does this mean that “God is absent”? Not at all: it just means that we encounter God under other circumstances than the traditional American way on sunday mornings. We encounter God instead at family occasions on an average of 4 to 5 times a year. Yes, our “God” does not “live” in an American temple or church. It does not mean, however, that “God” in general is absent from the livess of Danes. It just means that the American God is absent. It also follows that the Danish church is an extremely important factor in the construction of what Zuckerman thought was a society “without God”.




"It might be important to know that most academic reviews in the National papers in Denmark noted that Zuckermans book represented a classical example of an anthropologist or sociologist falling short, while being duped by the natives."

Karen Schousboe
MA, Anthropologist, http://www.kirkenikobenhavn.dk

Zuckerman 3

Bon festival dance
Religious festival: Japan


Let's turn to an analysis of religion in Japan and we will see the dishonesty of Zuerkerman at work fist hand. He claims Japan as a "atheist" country. This is largely because like so many atheists he confuses Buddhism with atheism because some Buddhists sects don't have a clear God figure. This is partly just ignorance, although I'm sure Zuckerman should know better himsef, but when most atheists make this claim they are just being ignorant because people from the West can make easy mistakes. For example, the East has never a big deal out of labels for religion. So one can find most families in Japan are both Buddhist and Shinto. But the unwary Westerner might think this means they are neither becasue we assume their traditions would fight over members. In reality the Buddhists and Shintists have an arrange in which Buddhism handles weddings and the Shinto priests do funerals. They do not fight over membership and most Japanese are both.


While stats on Christian population have been underrated! New study finds more Christians in Japan than previous thought.

More People Claim Christian Faith in Japan

By

Audrey Barrick

audrey@christianpost.com

Sun, Mar. 19 2006 10:24 AM ET


Shinto Priest

Shinto priest:Japan

The latest Gallup poll revealed a much higher percentage of Christians in Japan compared to previous surveys, including a surprising high number of teens who claimed the Christian faith.

More People Claim Christian Faith in Japan

Japanese people walk along Omotesando, a fashionable street in Tokyo, March 8, 2006. The latest Gallup poll revealed a much higher percentage of Christians in Japan compared to previous surveys, including a surprising high number of teens who claimed the

In a country where only one percent is Christian among those who claim a faith, findings from one of the most extensive surveys of the country ever taken showed a Christian population of six percent. Meanwhile, the most popular and traditional religions – Buddhism and Shintoism – suffered declines.

Of the 30 percent of adults who claimed to have a religion, 75 percent considered themselves Buddhists, 19 percent Shintoists and 12 percent Christians, according to the Gallup Organization. Japanese youth revealed even more alarming statistics. Of the 20 percent who professed to have a religion, 60 percent called themselves Buddhists, 36 percent Christians and Shintoists.

"These projections mean that seven percent of the total teenage population say they are Christians," said George Gallup Jr. who called the numbers "stunning."

The study - the single largest study ever attempted, according to the social scientists in Japan - examined preteens, teens, young adults, adults and seniors.


"When they saw the design of the questionnaire, Japanese experts argued that the Japanese would never answer the socially delicate and/or the highly personal questions," said Bill McKay, project research director. "However, it was our professional hunch that the Japanese were ready to talk and when they did they told us more than we had asked for. The data is the most revealing look behind the face of Japan and shatters many WWII myths of the Japanese culture."

McKay is also one of the producers of a documentary that is slated for release later this year. The poll was conducted in association with American Trademark Research and MJM Group in 2001 for use in the documentary.

"In my 50 years of polling, there has been no study that I would consider as important as this one, because it provides insight into a fascinating culture," said Gallup.

Delving into more specific attitudes, the poll also found a note of hopelessness in the responses to questions related to morality, spirituality and general views about life.

"And there is little evidence of eternal hope, although a considerable number do believe in some form of life afterlife," noted Gallup. And "there is little belief in 'absolutes,' and this is true across the all-generational groups."

In comparison to teens in the United States, Japanese teens showed a pessimistic outlook on life. Previous studies found that 85 percent of teens in Japan wondered why they existed while 22 percent of U.S. teens had the same thought. Additionally, 13 percent of Japanese teens always see a reason for their being on Earth compared to 76 percent of teens in the U.S, and 11 percent of Japanese teens wished they had never been born while 3 percent of U.S. teens wished the same.

Within an estimated population of 127.4 million in Japan, academics estimate that 20 to 30 percent of adults actively practice a particular faith, but the Agency for Cultural Affairs reported in 2003 that 213,826,700 citizens claimed a religion, according to the U.S. Department of State's latest International Religious Freedom Report.

Traditions Japanese religions still strong.

from Buddhism Today
March, 5, 2000
"Buddhims in Modern Japan"
by
Bhikkhu Prayudh Payutto

"Statistically, with a Buddhist population of approximately 75 million, or about 85 percent of the whole population, and with about 80,000 Buddhist temples attended by 200,000 priests, Japan is rightly called a Buddhist country."

New Religions spring up in Japan

"There has grown a deepened religious concern through works of Buddhist scholars devoted to the reinterpretation of Buddhist ideas. There have been increased Buddhist social and political roles through lay people taking a more active part in Buddhist organizations. With the coming of the new-born sects, there has been a reawakening to the Buddhist social ideal to make up for the faded social ethics of the old traditional sects, and a starting on a new course of the development of political power. So far, the energies of the Japanese Buddhists have been directed "not so much to the revival of the Buddhist culture as to the attempt to preserve and consolidate it amidst the essentially alien and hostile environment of modern" life.(Ibid. sitingP.V. Bapat (ed). 2500 years of Buddhism. (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1971), p. 401.)

Japan is not an atheist nation, it's a religious nation. 80% of their population are part of the faith known as "Buddhism."

Japanese still keep traditional religious festivals

Folk Beliefs In Modern Japan

a book: Originally published in 1994 by the Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University.

"Annual Events and The Transformation of Japanese Life"

Professor Ishii, Kenji (Kokugakuin University)

On the other hand, a number of more traditional Japanese festivals continue to be observed faithfully, including the first pilgrimage at New Year's[Glossary: oshogatsu][Glossary: hatsumode], the summer "All Saint's" festival of O-bon[Glossary: bon_matsuri], and the semi-annual visits to family tombs during the equinoctial weeks. But while public-opinion surveys dealing with Japanese attitudes toward religion confirm a continuing high level of participation in these annual events, it is also true that the Japanese style of life has undergone great changes in the postwar period, particularly since the period of high economic growth which began in the 1960s. And that fact hints that even when we see the same festivals of New Year's and O-bon being observed today, the way they are now observed has also changed substantially, relative to the way those same festivals were observed by our parents and grandparents. As a result, in this article, I want to undertake an analysis of the holiday calendar as observed in modern urban Japan, and use that data--limited though it may be--as a vehicle for an objective consideration of the changes and current status of Japanese religious life.

The test of this book is online

"Beginning with the first study, "Survey of Urban Life," fifty percent or more of respondents indicated their participation in the following seven events (listed in descending order of observance): Year-end housecleaning; eating buckwheat noodles on New Year's eve; celebrating setsubun (scattering good-luck beans on the last day of the lunar year); equinoctial visits to family tombs; New Year's pilgrimages; displaying pine and bamboo New Year's gate decorations; and the seasonal airing and storing of clothes."

"In the second study, "Survey of Ward Residents' Attitudes toward Culture," events drawing the participation of fifty percent or more of respondents included New Year's pilgrimages, birthday celebrations, Christmas, and setsubun. In the third survey, "Survey on Home Life," the corresponding events included family gatherings at holidays like New Year's and O-bon, visits to family tombs on equinox or on anniversary of death, celebrations of children's birthdays, and family celebrations of holidays like Christmas and Children's Day.17 "(Ibid)

This poll has reference to a long list of holidays and festivals equalling about 40 events on the calender, of which 50% of the overall population take part in most of them. This is a lot more religious participation than one finds in America.

Religious festivals still held and strongly attended:

I. Survey of Urban Life (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Bureau of Citizens' Affairs, December 1979)14

(Unit: %)

1. New Year's pilgrimage to shrine or temple: 65.3
2. Display New Year's bamboo and pine gate decorations, or display New Year's offerings: 51.8
3. Scatter good-luck beans[Glossary: mamemaki] on the last day of the lunar year (setsubun[Glossary: setsubun], February 2-3): 67.4
4. Make equinoctial visits to family tombs, offer ohagi or botamochi (traditional rice cake sweets): 66.3
5. Display dolls on Doll's Festival[Glossary: hina_matsuri] (March 3), or display carp streamers on Children's Day (May 5): 46.7
6. Spring flower-viewing excursions: 35.2
7. Take iris-leaf bath (May 5): 33.0
8. Air out and store seasonal clothes in summer: 50.2
9. Display Tanabata (Star Festival) decorations (July 7 or August 7): 24.6
10. Eat seasonal foods (early mackeral, summer eels, fall mushrooms, etc.): 45.2
11. Make temple/shrine visits on the first day of the horse[Glossary: hatsuuma], the day of the cock[Glossary: tori_no_ichi], or feast days to the deity Fudô Myôô, etc.: 20.3
12. Eat rice with red beans on celebratory occasions: 43.2
13. Display the Japanese flag on holidays: 10.1
14. Display pampas grass decorations and eat sweet rice dumplings on August 15 (harvest moon): 20.1
15. Observe major housecleaning at year-end: 84.7
16. Eat buckwheat noodles on New Year's eve: 83.8
17. Observe none of the above: 0.9
18. Don't know: 0.3

II. Kita-Ward Survey of Residents' Attitudes toward Culture (Tokyo-to, Kita-ku, October, 1988)15

(Unit: %)

1. New Year's pilgrimages: 70.2
2. Eat rice gruel with seven herbs (nanakusa gayu: January 7): 21.9
3. Observe setsubun by scattering good-luck beans: 57.6
4. Doll's Festival (March 3): 38.9
5. Spring flower viewing: 37.2
6. First day of the horse: 26.6
7. Tanabata: 17.3
8. Fifteenth night [harvest moon]: 14.0
9. Christmas: 59.8
10. Family birthday celebrations: 68.3
11. Other: 5.0
12. None of the above: 7.1
13. Total (M): 423.9

III. Survey on Home Life (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Office of Information, February, 1989)16

(Unit: %)

1. Celebrate children's birthdays: 59.9
2. Celebrate parents' or grandparents' birthdays: 37.2
3. Celebrate wedding anniversaries: 28.8
4. Family celebration of holidays like Christmas and Children's Day: 56.0
5. Home party on celebratory occasions (school entrance, graduation, first employment, etc.): 44.9
6. Home party with friends: 16.8
7. Visits to family tombs on equinox, or on anniversaries of death: 61.9
8. Family gatherings at holidays like New Year's and O-bon: 62.4
9. Other: 3.2
10. No response: 2.9
11. Total (M): 374.0

Beginning with the first study, "Survey of Urban Life," fifty percent or more of respondents indicated their participation in the following seven events (listed in descending order of observance): Year-end housecleaning; eating buckwheat noodles on New Year's eve; celebrating setsubun (scattering good-luck beans on the last day of the lunar year); equinoctial visits to family tombs; New Year's pilgrimages; displaying pine and bamboo New Year's gate decorations; and the seasonal airing and storing of clothes.

In the second study, "Survey of Ward Residents' Attitudes toward Culture," events drawing the participation of fifty percent or more of respondents included New Year's pilgrimages, birthday celebrations, Christmas, and setsubun. In the third survey, "Survey on Home Life," the corresponding events included family gatherings at holidays like New Year's and O-bon, visits to family tombs on equinox or on anniversary of death, celebrations of children's birthdays, and family celebrations of holidays like Christmas and Children's Day.17

The times, subjects, purposes, methods, and questions of the three surveys all differ, making it difficult to attempt any simple comparison of their results, but it nonetheless remains possible to point out several common characteristics. First, all three surveys display high rates of participation in events surrounding the New Year's holidays, including the traditional year-end housecleaning, eating year-end buckwheat noodles, displaying gate decorations of pine and bamboo, and making New Year's pilgrimages to shrines and temples. When Christmas is considered as falling within the category of year-end observances, the results indicate that the interest in observances around the period of year-end and New Year remains extremely high.

Second, outside the annual events associated with the year-end and New Year's holidays, a high level of participation is also evidenced for the celebrations of O-Bon and the equinoctial festivals associated with ancestral memorials. Third, a high rate of participation is also seen in the celebration of setsubun and birthdays. Since the observance of birthdays obviously differs depending on the date of birth, it falls outside the ethnological category of "annual events," but it is nonetheless observed at a very high rate.

Next, let me present some differing survey results as a comparison to the data from the aforementioned surveys. In December of 1990, I conducted a survey designed to reveal what annual events are currently observed by young people, and with whom they observe them (Table 1). I conducted the survey at two universities, one a church-affiliated women's college in Tokyo, and the other at the private university at which I am personally employed. The survey resulted in 225 replies.18

Of the annual events listed in the table, those observed by fifty percent or more of respondents include the following eight, in descending order of observance: New Year's (93.8%), Christmas (82.2%), O-Bon (73.7%), Mother's Day (70.2%), Setsubun (57.3%), Valentine's Day (56.9%), ÔharaeVI (53.8%), and the Spring equinox (53.3%).

The results of my survey confirm the high level of observance of the year-end and New Year's holidays, and of memorial rites to ancestors. Other observances showing a high level of observance in this survey include Mother's Day and Valentine's Day, both of which can be considered events observed primarily by young people.19

Zuckerman 2

Zuckerman and Paul both trade on the idea of "atheist countries." they use countries in which chruch affiliation is weak and define those as "atheist." There is no such ting as an "atheist country." The only atheist countries that ever existed were the USSR adn its satellites and Communist China. China is moving toward religious freedom. USSR no longer exits, and the new Russian and it's neighbors are now countries in which freedom of religion is practiced.



Europe and Japan are not nearly as weak on belief in God as they are on affiliation with Christian churches. They are not atheist countries.



A study or literary search by Greely and Jagodzinski demonstrate this ponit:



The Demand for Religion:

Hard Core Atheism and "Supply Side" Theory




Wolfgang Jagodzinski

University of Cologne




Andrew Greeley

University of Chicago

University of Arizona





The title "dmeand for religion" does not refur to the idea that religion is in big demand in those coutnires but it's an analysis of the "supply side" theory of religious origins that has become poular among anthropologists.





Nevertheless in the process of critique the authors prove that there is much more demand in most countries than Zuckerman would have us believe.

In this essay we mainly address ourselves to those variants of Secularization theories which predict a general decline in the demand for religion or at least in the demand for large transcendental systems. If this demand does not decline in the more advanced societies and if it correlates neither with age nor education nor time the core assumptions of Secularization theories are dis-confirmed. Since Communism may have accelerated this process of secularization we will pay particular attention to the development in former socialist countries. If the demand for religion should be high in all these societies this clearly would support the new economic approach.




Opponents (Blau, Land, and Redding 1992, Breault 1989; Bruce 1992; Demerath 1996; Land and Blau 1991) of the economic model of religion have been quick to respond. They have taken issue with some of the individual studies the "supply siders" have reported and also (Demerath 1996) have ridiculed the notion that religion can be the subject of "rational choice." The basic thrust of the criticism, however, implicit it might be, is doubt that there is no relatively consistent demand for religious "compensation..."

In this essay we address ourselves first to the question of that group in which a demand for religious services must be presumed to be non-existent – "hard core" atheists, those who are convinced both that God does not exist and that there is no possibility of life after death. If the proportion of populations in different countries which fall into this category are relatively small and if they correlate neither with age nor education nor time, then the "Supply Side" theory cannot be rejected: the proportion of the population which might have a latent demand for religion may still be substantial, even in supposedly secularized countries.

Then we turn to Norway, one of the allegedly "secularized" countries to determine whether it might be a religious market place that has been neglected by a "lazy monopoly." Next we consider data from Ireland to determine whether the open religious marketplace of Northern Ireland has produced a more "zealous" manifestation of Catholicism than that which can be found in the South where Catholicism has a de facto if not de jure monopoly; finally we ask whether Socialism in East Germany has been able to reduce the demand for religion, something which the supply side theory would implicitly think unlikely.

The authors used a questioniare asking respondents about thier beleifs to assertain weather they were "hard core, soft core" atheists, believers, involved in reilgion.



Their measure of "hard" and "soft" core atheisms includes:



Hard = convenced there is no God



soft type 1 = probably not a God but may be aferlife and spiruitality



soft type 2 = Agnostics; may or may not be a God, don't know.

Northern Europe not hard core atheist.





1. The proportion of Hard Core atheists is relatively small in all the countries except East Germany (42.7%)



2. The proportion is above 10% only in former socialist countries (12.4% in Russia, 13.9% in Slovenia, and 11.3% in Hungary) and in the Netherlands (11.4%) and in Israel (12.1%).



3. In the other eleven countries, the highest rates of Hard Core atheism are in Norway (6.7%) and Britain (6.3%). Thus if latent demand for religion is excluded only from the Hard Core atheists, there is still the possibility of a large clientele for those firms which might venture into the religious market place in such supposedly "secularized" countries as Norway and Britain.



4. There are not all that many Hard Core atheists in the countries studied, nor indeed all that many soft core atheists either.



5. The "Softest Core" Atheists are less than a third of the population in every country except East Germany. They are more than a fifth of the population only in four former Socialist countries – East German Russia, Hungary and Slovenia. With the exception than of East Germany more than two thirds of the population of the countries studied are willing to admit the existence in some fashion of God and the likelihood of life after death. Devout many of them may not be but on the two central issues they are more religious than not. They then may be considered as part of the religious market place if not always enthusiastic consumers.





Furthermore in the sample as a whole, Hard Core atheism correlates only with gender (women less likely to be atheists) and not with education or age (those favorite measures of the more naïve of the "secularization theorists.") 83% of the Hard Core Atheists say they never believed in God, 61% say they never attended church services when they were eleven or twelve years old and 9% more say they only rarely attended. The choice of Hard Core atheism as a philosophy of life was apparently made at a very young age in life and is sustained through the life course.




Age correlates significantly with Hard Core atheism only in Britain (r=-.08), East Germany (r=-.18), the Netherlands (r=-.05) and Israel (r=+.08), Hungary (-.14). Education correlates significantly with Hard Core Atheism only in Hungary (r=.11), Slovenia (r=.18), and Norway (r=.10) West Germany (r=.08), Israel (r=.10). In these countries as in the whole sample, there is an inverted U curve in the relationship between age and atheism, the very young and the very old being somewhat less likely to be atheists. In the middle years of life, however, the line representing atheism is flat. Only in Slovenia and Hungary is education still a significant correlate of Hard Core Atheism in a regression equation which includes age and gender.

Note that in their findings hard core atheism is not related to education or parental influence but to socialization





Zuckrman claims that the superior educational system in northern European, made possible by atheism, also breeds more atheism as people grow up being trained to be "rational" and "scientific." But this study shows that the real reason is not realted to education at all but to socialization. While atheists might try to argue "that's what we are saying" its' really not. They are actually arguing that education is waht produces it, but socialization means they just haven't been exposed to religious thinking enough. The upshot of this is that if they were so exposed they would probably see the value in religion so it is not 'enlightened thinking' but merely custum and lack of exposure, which is exactly what the atheist say causes people to be religious. So this is significant that the very same reasons they attribute religion to are actually behind atheism.

Furthermore in the sample as a whole, Hard Core atheism correlates only with gender (women less likely to be atheists) and not with education or age (those favorite measures of the more naïve of the "secularization theorists.") 83% of the Hard Core Atheists say they never believed in God, 61% say they never attended church services when they were eleven or twelve years old and 9% more say they only rarely attended. The choice of Hard Core atheism as a philosophy of life was apparently made at a very young age in life and is sustained through the life course.

No trend toward growth of atheism

The data in Table 3 provide little evidence of short run change in atheism rates. There is no significant relationship between time and Hard Core Atheism in the EVA study. With the possible exception of East Germany and Slovenia, the findings of the second EVS and the first ISSP studies are similar enough that it can be said that they replicate one another despite the different wording of the questions,. One can conclude that there is little support for the notion that atheism increased between 1981 and 1991. There are not many Hard Core atheists in the countries studied and their numbers did not increase during the nineteen eighties.

Data from the Norwegian version of 1991 International Social Survey program study of religion (which asked more questions than the standard ISSP module) provide an opportunity to replicate the Stark and Iannaccone findings (1995)that the so called "secularized" countries of Europe were not in fact secularized. Is Norway a country in which religion is moribund or is it perhaps a potential market place for religious competition? Might there be a potential demand for religion to which industrious "firms" might respond?



45% believe in God--ony 10% firmly do not

Forty five percent of Norwegians believe in God and only 10% firmly believe that God does not exist. 60% say that life after death is certain or probable and 58% say that in some fashion Jesus is their savior (a question asked only in the Norwegian version of the ISSP). It is difficult to dismiss a country with those rates as totally "secularized," especially since there is evidence (Greeley 1995 p87 ) that Norwegian belief in life after death has not changed in the last five decades. Hence it seems appropriate to ask what the condition of the religious market place in Norway might be and whether an increase in the supply of religious firms might lead eventually to a resurgence of observable religious practice

typology of religous market shows possiblity of belief high

We devised a typology of possible Norwegian religious market places. At the low end were the Atheists and the Agnostics who either rejected God firmly or said that they did not know about God’s existence. 22% of the respondents fell into these categories, 9% in the former and 13% in the later. The next level consisted of the "Marginally" religious, those who did not attend church services but expressed some kind of belief in God. 33% of the respondents fell into this category. The fourth level – which we call "Private" was occupied by those who believed in God but did not attend church services often, a quarter of the Norwegians. Finally there was a group we call Devout which both believed in God and attended Church services regularly. This group included 20% of the respondents. Thus (Table 4) almost half of Norwegians are religious in some fashion and only a fifth are either firm atheists or agnostics.




Religious beliefs among Norwegians increases as one moves in Table 4 from the Atheists to the Devout. However a surprising proportion of those who are Atheists and Agnostics acknowledge that God is loving, believe (at least probably) an afterlife, and that in some fashion Jesus is their savior. While these two groups could hardly be considered as prime religious markets in Norway, they are not without some religious inclinations.




Those who are Marginally religious constitute a market place that might be more ready to listen to new religious entrepreneurs. Almost half of them believe in life after death, two fifths acknowledge Jesus as savior, and seven out of ten believe that God is loving. Large majorities in the "Private" market place endorse these convictions and believe in the existence of heaven.




Similar patterns exist for religious practices in Table 5. Some Atheists attend services occasionally and some engage in the ceremony of lighting a candle on the grave. More than 2/5 contribute money to church organizations which in Norway is more of a civic than a religious practice. The Agnostics have certainly not cut themselves off completely from religion. 43% attend church services at least some times and 37% light a candle for the dead. The majority of the Marginals (58%) attend church services and light a candle for the dead (62%) and 21% of them have said prayers with a child at bed time. Thirty percent of the Private group pray at least once a week, 77% attend church services regularly and 30% have prayed with a child at night. In the Private and Devout groups the custom of lighting a candle for the dead is reported less frequently than in the Marginal group, perhaps because it is considered a folk custom.